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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
OKLAHOMA'S "MAKE MY DAY" LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 30, 1987, Governor Henry Bellmon signed into law
Oklahoma House Bill No. 15111 which contained the controversial
"Make My Day" law.2 This new law expanded Oklahoman's right to use
deadly force to protect their homes from intruders. In addition, the law
provides immunity from civil liability.3 The law changed hundreds of
years of self-defense in the home or defense of dwelling law in order to
protect the sanctity of the home. Although Oklahoma's "Make My
Day" law addresses both nondeadly and deadly force, the following dis-
cussion of the law will be generally limited to the use of deadly force and,
therefore, the defense of justifiable homicide.
II. DEFENSE OF DWELLING-HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT
A cursory look at the development of self-defense and defense of
dwelling law provides a background for examination of Oklahoma's pre-
vious and present law in this area. The doctrines of self-defense and de-
fense of dwelling have evolved over hundreds of years. An innocent
person's right to defend himself from an unlawful attack is well estab-
fished. The exact boundaries of this right to defend against an attack
inside or outside the home, however, are not easily defined. The diffi-
culty in defining the limits of self-defense and defense of dwelling reflects
the innumerable fact patterns under which the issue can arise, as well as
the confusing development of this area of the law.4
1. H. 1511, 41st Leg., 1987 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 205 (West).
2. Id. The bill was nicknamed the "Make My Day" bill early in its history. See Okla. Legis-
lative Reporter, March 20, 1987; 'Home is Castle'BilI Filed in Oklahoma Senate, NEw GUN WEEK,
Feb. 27, 1987, p. 2.
3. H. 1511, 41st Leg., 1987 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 205 (West).
4. See Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335 (1921). The Court stated that "historical mis-
takes" may be part of the law of self-defense. Id. at 343.
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A. Early English Law
Under the early English law regarding use of deadly force in self-
defense, the defender was justified in the use of deadly force only when
committed in execution of the King's law.5 In other situations when an
innocent person killed another in self-defense, the defender was convicted
of homicide but was often automatically pardoned.6 The early English
law of self-defense included the requirement that the degree of force used
by the defender could not be greater than the threat of the attacker as
reasonably perceived by the defender.7 The early English law of self-
defense further required that a defender was justified in using deadly
force against an attacker only when he had retreated "to the wall."8
In 1532, England enacted a statute codifying the common law, but
failed to address the duty to retreat.9 Perhaps because the statute was
silent regarding the duty to retreat, confusion still reigned in this area.
The English courts split in their application of the duty to retreat under
the new statute. Some courts required an innocent victim to safely re-
treat from a murderous attack, while others imposed no such duty.10
The law and the courts continued to require, however, that the amount
of force used by the defender be proportionate to the force used by the
attacker. I I
Somewhat different rules developed with regard to use of deadly
force to defend one's dwelling. In early England, the castle was seen as a
sanctuary from danger. The protection it offered was jealously protected
by the law.12 The duty to retreat was not imposed when the defender
was warding off an assault upon the castle. 13 Early English law reflected
the high regard for the castle as a refuge.
14
5. Beale, Retreat from a Murderous Assault, 16 HARV. L. REV. 567, 567-68 (1903).
6. Id. at 568; W. WALSH, OUTLINES OF THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LAW
373-74 (1923).
7. Comment, Criminal Law-Lovers and Other Strangers: Or, When Is A House a Castle?-
Privilege of Non-Retreat in the Home Held Inapplicable to Legal Co-Occupants--State V. Bobbitt, 415
So. 2d 724 (Fla. 1982), 11 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 465, 467 (1983) [hereinafter Castle Doctrine].
8. Comment, Dwelling Defense Law in Missouri: In Search of Castles, 50 UMKC L. REv. 64,
66 (1981) [hereinafter Dwelling Defense Law in Missouri].
9. Id.; see also 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 478-79 (1968).
10. Dwelling Defense Law in Missouri, supra note 7, at 66-67.
11. 3 J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 12 (1883); 4 STEPHENS'
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 38 (W. Winder & L. Warmington eds. 1950).
12. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 223 (1898). In discussing the right of habitation,
Blackstone stated that, "the law of England has so particular and tender a regard to the immunity of
a man's house, that it styles it his castle, and will never suffer it to be violated with impunity ......
IdL
13. Castle Doctrine, supra note 7, at 467-68.
14. 5 Coke 91, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (1604); see also Comment, Is a House a Castle?, 9 CONN. L.
[Vol. 23:533
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B. American law
1. Criminal liability for defense of dwelling
American courts and legislatures adopted and codified the English
law in the area of self-defense. The duty to retreat when threatened with
a deadly assault was adopted by some states.15 Others adopted what
came to be called the "true-man" rule holding that retreat was unneces-
sary to justify homicide committed in self-defense.' 6
All states, however, adopted the rule that deadly force could be used
only when the defender believed that death or serious bodily injury was
threatened.17 Some jurisdictions held that the homicide was justified
when that belief was honest, 18 while other jurisdictions required a rea-
sonable belief.19
REv. 110, 114 (1976) (characterizing early English defense of habitation law as allowing deadly
force to defend any intrusion on the home). The Semayne's Case stated:
That the house of every one is to him as his castle and fortress, as well for his defence
against injury and violence, as for his repose; and although the life of man is a thing pre-
cious and favoured in law; so that although a man kills another in his defence, or kills one
per infortun', without any intent, yet it is felony, and in such case he shall forfeit his goods
and chattels, for the great regard which the law has to a man's life; but if thieves come to a
man's house to rob him, or murder, and the owner of his servants kill any of the thieves in
defence of himself and his house, it is not felony, and he shall lose nothing.
Semayne's Case, 5 Coke 91, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (1604). The two classifications of homicide
recognized in England are reflected in the court's language. For homicide in self-defense, the de-
fendant was required to forfeit his goods. Homicide in defense of the home, however, was justified
and the defendant lost nothing. For a discussion of homicide in self-defense and justifiable homicide,
see Green, The Jury of the English Law of Homicid 1200-1600, 74 MICH. L. REv. 413, 428-44
(1976).
15. King v. State, 233 Ala. 198, 171 So. 254 (1936); State v. Donnelly, 69 Iowa 705, _, 27
N.W. 369, 370 (1886); State v. Cox, 138 Me. 151, -, 23 A.2d 634, 641-42 (1941); State v. Dettmer,
124 Mo. 426, _, 27 S.W. 1117, 1119 (1894); State v. Abbott, 36 N.J. 63, _, 174 A.2d 881, 884-86
(1961); State v. Jackson, 227 S.C. 271, -_, 87 S.E.2d 681, 685 (1955). An early Alabama court
upheld jury instructions that embodied the rationale behind the duty to retreat. "'In the system [of
self-defense] so established no balm or protection is provided for wounded pride or honor in declin-
ing combat, or sense of shame in being denounced as cowardly. Such thoughts are trash, as com-
pared with the inestimable right to live.'" Springfield v. State, 96 Ala. 81, _ I1 So. 250, 252
(1892).
16. Brown v. U.S., 256 U.S. 335, 342-43 (1921); People v. Hecker, 109 Cal. 451, -, 42 P. 307,
313 (1895); Enyart v. People, 67 Colo. 434, -, 180 P. 722, 723-24 (1919); Runyan v. State, 57 Ind.
80, 84 (1877); Burgess v. Territory, 8 Mont. 57, -, 19 P. 558, 566 (1888); Willis v. State, 43 Neb.
102, - 61 N.W. 254, 258-59 (1894); State v. Grimmett, 33 Nev. 531, 112 P. 273 (1910); Erwin v.
State, 29 Ohio St. 186, 200 (1876); Voight v. State, 53 Tex. Crim. 258, 109 S.W. 205, 206-07 (1908);
State v. Carter, 15 Wash. 121, 45 P. 745, 746 (1896).
17. 2 F. WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 125 (C. Torcia 14th ed. 1979).
18. See State v. Cope, 78 Ohio App. 429, -, 67 N.E.2d 912, 917 (1946) (taking into account
the particular qualities of the defendant rather than the qualities of a reasonably brave man); People
v. Lennon, 71 Mich. 298, 38 N.W. 871, 872-73 (1888) (defendant's weakness should be weighed in
his favor).
19. The reasonableness of the belief must be analyzed under the facts of each case. As Justice
Holmes stated, "Detached reflection cannot be demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife."
Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921).
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The American defense of dwelling law often appears to be more an
application of self-defense principles to attacks on the home and its occu-
pants, rather than an adoption of the separate defense of habitation law
that developed around the English castle."0 While American courts have
adopted the language and rhetoric surrounding the English castle doc-
trine, case law reveals that courts often applied self-defense principles
with some modification regarding the duty to retreat.2 1 American courts
and statutes have traditionally maintained the proportionality require-
ment so that an occupant of a dwelling could use only that amount of
physical force necessary to repel an intruder.2 2 Many states adopted stat-
utes providing that deadly force could only be used when serious bodily
injury, death, or certain serious crimes were threatened 3.2  Despite con-
fusing language used by American courts, self-defense principles requir-
ing threatened harm to the defender or other members of the household
were often applied to attacks upon the home.
20. See Comment, Is a House a Castle?, 9 CONN. L. REv. 110 (1976) (although courts may use
broad defense of habitation language, decisions are generally based on the doctrine of self-defense); 1
W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 5.9(b) (1986) (the broad defense of
habitation rule has generally not been used by courts).
21. An early Vermont court explained defense of habitation by comparing it to self-defense.
State v. Patterson, 45 Vt. 308 (1873).
The sense in which the house has a peculiar immunity, is, that it is sacred for the protec-
tion of his person, and of his family. An assault on the house can be regarded as an assault
on the person, only in case the purpose of such assault be injury to the person of the
occupant, or members of his family, and in order to accomplish this, the assailant attacks
the castle, in order to reach the inmate.
Id. See also, People v. Ceballos, 12 Cal. 3d 470, -, 526 P.2d 241, 249, 116 Cal. Rptr. 233, 239-40
(1974) (mechanical device could not be used in defense of habitation where dweller was not home
and thus not threatened with great bodily harm); Crawford v. State, 231 Md. 354, 190 A.2d 538, 542
(1963) (noting the rules regarding the defense of one's dwelling "are generally similar" to self-de-
fense principles); State v. Schaefer, 295 S.E.2d 814, 817-18 (W. Va. 1982) (stating where a person
lives is their castle while discussing self-defense and defense of family).
22. 2 W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 5.7(b) (1986); see also Bray v.
State, 16 Ala. App. 433, 78 So. 463, 464 (1918) (unless the defendant reasonably believed death or
serious bodily injury was threatened, deadly force to repel a trespasser was not justified); State v.
Ivicsics, 604 S.W.2d 773, 777 (Mo. App. 1980) (deadly force may not be used in defense of habita-
tion where personal assault is not likely to cause death or serious bodily harm); State v. Miller, 267
N.C. 409, -, 148 S.E.2d 279, 281 (1966) (homicide is not justified if defendant uses excessive force
in defending person or habitation).
23. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-508 provides that deadly force may be used in self-defense or when
a person "reasonably believes the use of such force is necessary to prevent the commission of arson
or burglary by a trespasser"; GA. CODE ANN. § 26-903 (Harrison 1983) provides that deadly force
may be used to prevent or terminate an entry made "in a violent and tumultuous manner" so that
the person believes personal violence is threatened or when the entry is made "for the purpose of
committing a felony;" MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-3-103 (1987) and UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-405
(1978) are similar to the Georgia statute.
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2. Civil liability for defense of dwelling
In addition to criminal liability for the use of force in protection of
the home civil liability may arise if the defender's conduct was not rea-
sonable.24 Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, deadly force may
be used to prevent or terminate an intrusion when the "actor reasonably
believes that the intruder, unless expelled or excluded, is likely to cause
death or serious bodily harm ... ,2 Use of deadly force is also privi-
leged to prevent a felony of the type which threatens death or serious
bodily injury, or which involves breaking and entering a dwelling.26 Fur-
ther, no duty to retreat exists when an attack upon a person occurs in the
dwelling.27
The Restatement principles mirror the criminal defense of habita-
tion principles. Perhaps for this reason courts have generally held that
the criminal defense applies as well to a civil action.28 Therefore, if the
homeowner reasonably believes that use of deadly force is necessary to
protect the home or its occupants from a felony or serious bodily injury,
civil liability should not attach.
III. OKLAHOMA'S SELF-DEFENSE AND DEFENSE
OF DWELLING LAW
A. History of Self-defense and Defense of Dwelling
1. Criminal liability for defense of dwelling
In Oklahoma, self-defense and defense of dwelling law are quite sim-
ilar. No duty to retreat exists whether the attack occurs inside or outside
24. See Annotation, Civil Liability for Use of Firearm in Defense of Habitation or Property, 100
A.L.R.2d 1021, 1025 (1965). while the governing principle is reasonableness, each case must be
determined on its facts. However, "[tihe courts are nearly unanimous ... that a person acting
under the reasonable belief that his home is about to be invaded by an intruder may use a firearm in
defense thereof without incurring civil liability." Id. at 1025.
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 79 (1965).
26. Id. at § 143(2).
27. Id. at § 65.
28. See Evans v. Hughes, 135 F. Supp. 555 (D.C.N.C. 1955) (defendant not criminally liable
on the basis of self-defense is also not civilly liable); Nakashima v. Takase, 8 Cal. App. 2d 35, -, 46
P.2d 1020, 1022 (1935) (California's justifiable homicide statute discussed in death action where
circumstances were sufficient to "exonerate defendant from any civil or criminal liability"); Hamil-
ton v. Howard, 234 Ky. 321, -, 28 S.W.2d 7, 10 (1930) (defense of habitation not applicable in
action for damages for assault and battery where defendant followed victim from house and shot him
250 yards from house); Smith v. Delery, 238 La. 180, -., 114 So. 2d 857, 858-59 (1959) (defendant's
shooting of fourteen-year-old newspaper boy justified in action for damages because defendant acted
as a "reasonable and prudent man in the belief that he and his family were in immediate danger");
Anderson v. Jenkins, 220 Miss. 145, -, 70 So. 2d 535, 537-38 (Miss. 1954) (defendant liable for
damages when he shot teen-age trespasser despite prior warning).
19881
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of the home.29 Oklahoma courts' statements of the law of self-defense
and defense of dwelling are often interrelated or identical.30 In codifying
the law, defense of dwelling was not set out under a separate statute, but
was included within the statutes addressing self-defense and justifiable
homicide.31
Oklahoma's justifiable homicide statute is divided into three sec-
tions, each addressing types of situations where deadly force may be
used.32 First, a homicide is justifiable to resist murder or a felony upon
the person or upon or in his house if he is present.33 Second, a homicide
is justifiable when the defender reasonably believes imminent danger of a
felony or design to do great personal harm to him, his family, or servants
exists.34 Finally, a homicide is justifiable when trying to apprehend a
felon, to suppress a riot, or to keep the peace.35
The present justifiable homicide statute was in effect in 1914 when
the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals discussed whether a duty to
retreat existed. 36  Self-defense law was applied when the owner of a
"joint" shot and killed a man after they argued over a card game.37 The
29. Fowler v. State, 8 Okla. Crim. 130, 126 P. 831 (1912); Mulkey v. State, 5 Okla. Crim. 75,
113 P. 532 (1911); Turner v. State, 4 Okla. Crim. 164, 111 P. 988 (1910); Mahaffey v. Territory, I 1
Okla. 213, 66 P. 342 (1901), rev'd on other grounds, 13 Okla. 466, 74 P. 901 (1903).
30. See Collegenia v. State, 9 Okla. Crim. 425, 132 P. 375 (1913); Armstrong v. State, 11 Okla.
Crim. 159, 143 P. 870 (1914).
31. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 733 (1981) provides:
Homicide is also justifiable when committed by any person in either of the following
cases:
1. When resisting any attempt to murder such person, or to commit any felony upon
him, or upon or in any dwelling house in which such person is; or,
2. When committed in the lawful defense of such person, or of his or her husband,
wife, parent, child, master, mistress, or servant, when there is a reasonable ground to ap-
prehend a design to commit a felony, or to do some great personal injury, and imminent
danger of such design being accomplished; or,
3. When necessarily committed in attempting, by lawful ways and means, to appre-
hend any person for any felony committed; or in lawfully suppressing any riot; or in law-
fully keeping and preserving the peace.
Id OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 643 (1981) also addresses the use of force in self-defense:
To use or attempt to offer to use force or violence upon or toward the person of another is
not unlawful in the following cases:
3. When committed either by the party about to be injured, or by any other person
in his aid or defense, in preventing or attempting to prevent an offense against his person,
or any trespass or other unlawful interference with real or personal property in his lawful
possession; provided the force or violence used is not more than sufficient to prevent such
offense.




36. See Armstrong v. State, 11 Okla. Crim. 159, 143 P. 870, 872 (1914).
37. Fowler v. State, 8 Okla. Crim. 130, 126 P. 831 (1912).
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defendant was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree and appealed
alleging error in the self-defense instructions.38 In condemning the in-
structions requiring the defendant to retreat, the court discussed develop-
ment of the duty to retreat. According to the court, retreat to the wall
was required under the old common law. In America, however, the law
provided a wall of rights. This wall of rights was always at a defender's
back and thus allowed self-defense without the duty to retreat. 9
In Collegenia v. State,4° the Oklahoma Court of Appeals discussed
defense of dwelling principles as well as self-defense principles. 41 The
defendant was accused and convicted of killing a peace officer. Evidence
revealed, however, that the attack occurred in or around the defendant's
home, and that the peace officer was not necessarily justified in his as-
sault on the defendant. On appeal, the defendant argued that the court's
failure to instruct the jury regarding justifiable homicide in self-defense
was reversible error.42 The court cited early English authorities and
stated that the domicile could be defended from unlawful attack, and
that the defense could consist of deadly force if a felony was threatened.
However, the court recognized that deadly force would not be justified
unless a felony was involved and the danger was imminent.43
Oklahoma's self-defense and defense of dwelling law also requires
that the defender's belief in danger of serious bodily injury or imminent
death be reasonable. In Jamison v. State,' the Oklahoma Court of Crim-
inal Appeals examined the two views which addressed the defender's be-
lief that danger was imminent. Under one view, an honest belief justified
38. Id. at 833.
39. Id The court stated:
Under the old common law, no man could defend himself until he had retreated, and until
his back was to the wall; but this is not the law in free America. Here the wall is to every
man's back. It is the wall of his rights; and when he is at a place where he has a right to be,
and he is unlawfully assailed, he may stand and defend himself; and cases sometimes arise
in which he has the right, when unlawfully assailed, to advance and defend himself until he
finds himself out of danger.
40. 9 Okla. Crim. 425, 132 P. 375 (1913).
41. Id. at 379-80.
42. Id. at 378, 381.
43. Id. at 379. The value of human life was recognized when the court stated its view of the law
regarding self-defense and defense of dwelling:
The law in its humanity will not justify the taking of life to repel a mere trespass or
invasion of the home without felonious intent or in resisting a nonfelonious assault; but a
man who is without fault may repel force with force in defense of his person, habitation, or
property against any one or many who manifestly intend and endeavor with violence to
commit a felony thereon or therein. In such case he is not compelled to retreat, but may
pursue his adversary until he finds himself out of danger, and, if in the conflict between
them he happens to kill him, such killing is justifiable.
Id. at 379-80.
44. 35 Okla. Crim. 302, 250 P. 548 (1926).
1988)
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the killing, but under the other view, a reasonable belief was required. 4
The court indicated that Oklahoma had adopted the majority view re-
quiring a reasonable belief. The court stated that "the apprehension of
danger and belief of necessity which will justify killing in self-defense
must be a reasonable apprehension and belief, such as a reasonable man
would, under the circumstances, have entertained. '46 Although the cir-
cumstances are to be considered from the defendant's point of view at the
time of the killing, the killing is justified only if a reasonable man would
have believed danger of death or serious bodily injury was imminent.4 7
Therefore, cowardice or unreasonable fear will not justify the killing.
48
2. Civil liability for defense of dwelling
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has recognized that criminal self-
defense principles may influence the determination of the reasonableness
of a defendant's conduct in a civil suit for wrongful death.49 In a civil
suit, the duty of care owed to the victim must first be determined. Under
the common negligence standard, the defendant may owe the victim an
"affirmative duty to exercise ordinary care."50 If the victim is a tres-
passer, however, the "applicable test of defendant's liability [is] whether
his conduct amounted to intentional harm or willful or wanton injury."'5 1
In Foster v. Emery,52 the defender feared more than a simple tres-
pass on his property because of past incidents of "prowling and window-
peeping."" Even though the trespasser had invaded the curtilage of the
home, the court only discussed self-defense and defense of others. 4 The
court found that use of deadly force, unavailable where simple trespass is
involved, may result in civil liability "only if, in view of [defendant's]
'mental state', his conduct was 'so unreasonable and dangerous' as to
charge him with knowledge that his acts would 'in all common
45. Id. at 550.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 551.
48. Id.
49. Foster v. Emery, 495 P.2d 390, 394 (Okla. 1972).
50. Id. at 392.
51. Id.
52. 495 P.2d 390 (Okla. 1972).
53. Id. at 394.
54. Id The curtilage is the area that immediately surrounds the dwelling. While defense of
habitation principles apply to attacks occurring in the curtilage of a dwelling, the defense is not
applicable where no felony is attempted or bodily harm threatened. The trespass must be suffered
and redress sought in the law. Turpen v. State, 89 Okla. Crim. 6, 204 P.2d 298 (1949).
[Vol. 23:533
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probability' result in injury."' 5  The court upheld instructions that gener-
ally reflected the self-defense principles of Oklahoma's Criminal Code.5 6
B. The New Law as Proposed
On February 12, 1987, Senate Bill No. 122 was introduced to the
Oklahoma Legislature. 57 The bill as introduced provided that an occu-
pant of a dwelling could use physical force, including deadly force
against an intruder when the occupant reasonably believed that the in-
truder had committed or intended to commit a crime or believed that the
intruder intended to use even a slight amount of physical force against
the occupant.5 8 The bill also provided criminal and civil immunity from
liability.59 This would have been a significant departure from existing
Oklahoma defense of dwelling law in several aspects: (1) the crime com-
mitted in the dwelling would have been reduced from a felony to any
crime or even a suspected crime, (2) the threatened force to justify homi-
cide would have been reduced from a danger of death or serious bodily
injury to any force, however slight, and (3) the defender would have been
immune from criminal liability rather than having an affirmative
defense.6°
The bill also included a proposal to amend Oklahoma's justifiable
55. 495 P.2d at 394. This conduct would then meet the legal standard of "wanton." Id. at 392-
93.
56. Id. at 394-95; see also Thweatt v. Ontko, 814 F.2d 1466 (10th Cir. 1987) (Oklahoma's
criminal law regarding self-defense and defense of others applied in civil suit; defendant's violation of
city ordinance prohibiting discharging firearms within 600 feet of a residence not negligence per se).
57. S. 122, 41st Leg., Ist Sess. (1987) (as introduced). The bill as introduced stated:
SECTION 1. NEW LAW A new section of law to be codified in the Oklahoma Statutes
as Section 1289.25 of Title 21, unless there is created a duplication in numbering, reads as
follows:
A. The Legislature hereby recognizes that the citizens of the State of Oklahoma have a
right to expect absolute safety within their own homes.
B. Any occupant of a dwelling is justified in using any degree of physical force, including
but not limited to deadly force, against another person who has made an unlawful entry
into that dwelling, and when the occupant has a reasonable belief that such other person
has committed a crime in the dwelling in addition to the unlawful entry, or is committing
or intends to commit a crime against a person or property in addition to the unlawful
entry, and when the occupant has a reasonable belief that such other person might use any
physical force, no matter how slight, against any occupant of the dwelling.
C. Any occupant of a dwelling using physical force, including but not limited to deadly
force, pursuant to the provisions of subsection B of this section, shall be immune from
criminal prosecution for the reasonable use of such force and shall be immune from any
civil liability for injuries or death resulting from the reasonable use of such force.
SECTION 2. This act shall become effective November 1, 1987.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Compare S. 122, 41st Leg., 1st Sess. (1987) (as introduced) with OKLA. STAT. tit. 21 § 733
(1981).
9
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homicide statute.61 The most significant change proposed that homicide
would be justified when the defender reasonably believed "personal in-
jury" rather than "great personal injury" was threatened. Although the
bill met with strong opposition during House debate,62 the measure
passed by a vote of seventy to twenty-six.63
Recognizing that existing Oklahoma law adequately provided for
self-defense and defense of the home, Governor Bellmon refused to sign
the bill.64 Bellmon indicated that several serious issues were raised by
the bill: (1) limitation of a wrongful death action under the civil immu-
nity provision violated the Oklahoma Constitution, (2) jury determina-
tion of justifiable homicide airs the facts and is preferable to immunity
from criminal prosecution, and (3) civilized society does not condone
killing when only slight physical force is threatened. Deeply critical of
the bill, Bellmon stated that "[t]he only people this bill 'makes the day'
for are potential murderers and their defense attorneys. "65
C. Changes Under the New Law as Enacted
1. Changes in the criminal law
Although narrower than the vetoed proposal, Oklahoma's new de-
fense of habitation law as enacted significantly changes the criminal law
regarding defense of habitation. Under existing statutory and case law,
deadly force may be used only when necessary to prevent a felony or
when serious bodily injury or death is threatened. 66 The new law pro-
vides that deadly force may be used against an intruder who has unlaw-
fully entered the dwelling as long as the "occupant has a reasonable belief
that such other person might use any physical force, no matter how
61. S. 122, 41st Leg., 1st Sess. (1987) (Committee Substitute).
62. OKLAHoMA LEGISLATIVE REPORTER, at 4-5 (April 10, 1987). Opposition to the bill was
generated by accounts that a similar Colorado law had not had the intended result of protecting
homeowners. Legislators expressed fears that the law would result in "wholesale killing," "open
season on [Oklahoma] citizens," "hot-headed people" getting away with murder, and policeman
being killed with the killer going free. Id. at 5.
63. Id.
64. Objections Resulting in Veto of Senate Bill 122. Governor Bellmon cited Mulky v. State, 5
Okla. Crim. 75, 113 P. 532 (1911) (sic); Adams v. State, 93 Okla. Crim. 333, 228 P.2d 195 (1951);
Anderson v. State, 90 Okla. Crim. 1, 209 P.2d 721 (1949); and Terhune v. State, 530 P.2d 557 (Okla.
Crim. 1974) for the proposition that Oklahoma's present law adequately provides for self-defense
and protection of the home. The Governor believed the "criminal element of our society" could
abuse the law. Id.
65. Id.
66. See supra notes 29-48 and accompanying text.
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slight, against any occupant of the dwelling."67 Should a criminal prose-
cution arise "from the reasonable use of such force," the occupant will
have an affirmative defense.6" The affirmative defense is similar to the
previous criminal law.
2. Changes in civil liability
The law as enacted provides for immunity from civil liability for the
reasonable use of force under the new standard set out in the statute.69
Oklahoma courts previously determined the reasonableness of an alleged
tortfeasor's conduct by considering standards of self-defense as set out in
the Oklahoma Criminal Code.7° However, under the new standard for
determining reasonableness of conduct, the alleged tortfeasor need only
show a reasonable belief that the intruder might use even slight physical
force.71
While the legislature may lower the standard of what constitutes
reasonable conduct, the civil immunity from- a wrongful death action
presents a constitutional question. The Oklahoma Constitution prohibits
legislative acts that abrogate "[Ihe right of action to recover damages for
injuries resulting in death."' 72 This provision has been interpreted to
mean that "the legislature. . . may not withdraw, take away, annul, or
repeal the provisions of [the wrongful death statute], ' 73 and that "the
right of action . . . is the right to effectively pursue a remedy."'74 This
statute's provision for immunity from civil liability arguably "takes
away" a "victim's right to effectively pursue a remedy" that had existed
before the statute was enacted. Therefore, the constitutionality of the
statute can be seriously questioned.
IV. RECOMMENDATION
A. "Make My Day" Provision Regarding Criminal Liability
Should Be Repealed
Oklahoma's previous law provided adequate protection from crimi-
nal liability for those who reasonably used deadly force in defense of their
67. H. 1511, 41st Leg. 1987 Okla. Sess. Law. Serv. 205 (West).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See supra notes 49-56 and accompanying text.
71. H. 1511; 41st Leg. 1987 Okla. Sess. Law. Serv. 205 (West).
72. OKLA. CONST. art. 23, § 7.
73. F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Todd, 204 Okla. 532, 535, 231 P.2d 681, 684 (1951).
74. Roberts v. Merrill, 386 P.2d 780, 783 (Okla. 1963).
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dwelling and its occupants. Governor Bellmon recognized this when he
vetoed the initial "Make My Day" proposal. He stated that existing law
offered adequate protection and that few homeowners were prosecuted
for defending their homes.7"
An inherent tension exists between a person's right to protect the
home, and the sanctity of human life. This tension was reflected in previ-
ous Oklahoma law because the homeowner was justified in using deadly
force when harm was threatened76 but not against a mere trespasser.77
In vetoing the earlier version of the law, Governor Bellmon stated that
"allowing killing for slight personal injury is contrary to standards of
civilized society."' 78 The law as enacted, however, favors the person's
right to protect the home over the sanctity of human life by allowing
killing when "any physical force, no matter how slight," might be used.
79
Thus, the new law's omission of any proportionality requirement makes
it subject to abuse. For example, a large man could shoot an unarmed
person much smaller and of no physical threat to him whatsoever. For
these reasons, the portion of the law changing the criminal law regarding
defense of habitation should be repealed.
B. "'Make My Day" Provision Regarding Civil Immunity is a
Necessary Tort Reform
Civil immunity from liability provides a homeowner who has been
exonerated from criminal charges with much-needed protection. The de-
fendant should be immune from civil liability if criminal charges for the
act are not filed or if he is exonerated in criminal proceedings. Under
present law, the victim may bring a civil suit whether or not criminal
charges have been filed.80 The defender is faced with two potentially
costly options-the suit may be settled or defended. Because courts look
to the criminal law to help determine the reasonableness of the defender's
conduct, 81 if that conduct has been found to be reasonable under crimi-
nal law, the defender's assets should not be threatened with a civil suit.
The victim's use of the law creates a lawsuit with nuisance value, forcing
the defender to settle or to pay attorney's fees. Even if such immunity in
75. Objections Resulting in Veto of Senate Bill 122.
76. See supra notes 30-50 and accompanying text.
77. Turpen v. State, 89 Okla. Crim. 6, 204 P.2d 298 (1949); Hovis v. State, 83 Okla. Crim. 299,
176 P.2d 833 (1947).
78. Objections Resulting in Veto of Senate Bill 122.
79. H. 1511, 41st Leg. 1987 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 205 (West).
80. See Foster v. Emery, 495 P.2d 390, 391 (Okla. 1972).
81. Id. at 394.
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a wrongful death action is found to be unconstitutional, 2 a constitu-
tional amendment could cure this problem. Characterized as a tort re-
form measure, the "Make My Day" provision providing immunity from
civil liability should be maintained. However, exoneration from criminal
liability should be based on the statutory law and case law in existence
before the "Make My Day" law was passed.
V. CONCLUSION
The changes effected in the criminal law by the new "Make My
Day" law raise many philosophical questions on the value of human life,
as well as many legal questions regarding self-defense and defense of
dwelling law. Because previously existing criminal law adequately pro-
tected homeowners and because the new law is subject to abuse, the
"Make My Day" criminal liability provision should be repealed. The
provision of the law that provides homeowners with immunity from civil
liability, however, provides needed protection and should remain in ef-
fect, but should be based on the criminal law previously in existence.
Donna Smith
82. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
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